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Abstract—Searchable encryption (SE) is one of the key en-
ablers for building encrypted databases. It allows a cloud server
to search over encrypted data without decryption. Dynamic SE
additionally includes data addition and deletion operations to en-
rich the functions of encrypted databases. Recent attacks exploit-
ing the leakage in dynamic operations drive rapid development
of new SE schemes revealing less information while performing
updates; they are also known as forward and backward private
SE. Newly added data is no longer linkable to queries issued
before, and deleted data is no longer searchable in queries issued
later. However, those advanced SE schemes reduce the efficiency
of SE, especially in the communication cost between the client and
server. In this paper, we resort to the hardware-assisted solution,
aka Intel SGX, to ease the above bottleneck. Our key idea is
to leverage SGX to take over the most tasks of the client, i.e.,
tracking keyword states along with data addition and caching
deleted data. However, handling large datasets is non-trivial due
to the I/O and memory constraints of the SGX enclave. We
further develop batch data processing and state compression
technique to reduce the communication overhead between the
SGX and untrusted server, and minimise the memory footprint
in the enclave. We conduct a comprehensive set of evaluations on
both synthetic and real-world datasets, which confirm that our
designs outperform the prior art.
I. INTRODUCTION
Searchable encryption (SE) [37], [16] is designed to enable
a user outsource its data to remote servers (i.e cloud) securely
while preserving search functionalities. It is considered as the
most promising solution to build encrypted databases defend-
ing against data breaches. Generic solutions like fully homo-
morphic encryption, multi-party computation, and oblivious
RAM (ORAM) achieve strong security but introducing consid-
erable computational and communication overhead. Property-
preserving encryption like deterministic encryption and order-
preserving/revealing encryption is very efficient and legacy
compatible in databases, but those solutions are not secure
in practice [34], [2]. The reasonable security and performance
tradeoff brought by SE drives rapid development of new SE on
search functionalities [12], [42], [30], security [4], [6], [29],
and efficiency [19], [20].
In [9], Cash et al. introduced the concept of active attacks
against dynamic SE; the leakage in data update operations
could be exploited to compromise the security of SE. After
that, Zhang et al. [45] proposed the first instantiation of active
attacks called file-injection attacks through the exploitation
of the leakage in data addition. This work raises a question
whether a dynamic SE scheme with less leakage can be
designed to mitigate existing and even prevent prospective
active attacks. To address this question, forward and backward
private SE schemes [4], [6], [40], [24] have drawn much
attention recently.
In dynamic SE, the notion of forward privacy means that
the linkability between newly added data and previously
issued search queries should be hidden against the server,
and the notion of backward privacy means that the linkability
between deleted data and search queries after deletion should
be hidden. To achieve higher security for SE, efficiency of SE
is compromised. Existing forward and backward private SE
schemes [6], [40], [24] introduce large overhead in storage
and computation at both client and server, and/or increase the
client-server interaction. In order to maintain the efficiency of
SE, an alternative approach is to employ the hardware-assisted
solution, i.e., Intel SGX, where native code and data can
be executed in a trusted and isolated execution environment.
SGX provides I/O communication interface to support trusted
execution from a given application. They are ecall-invoking a
function within SGX from the application, and ocall- invoking
a function defined in the application from SGX. Recent work
in ORAM powered by SGX [33] demonstrates that SGX can
be treated as a delegate of client, so as to ease the overhead of
client storage and computation, and reduce the communication
cost between the client and server.
Recently, Amjad et al. [1] proposed the first forward and
backward private SE schemes using SGX. As generic ORAM
or ORAM-like data structures can natively be adapted to
achieve the strongest forward and backward privacy in SE
(i.e., Type-I backward privacy [6]), one of their schemes
is built from ORAM, where data addition and deletion are
completely oblivious to the server [1]. It is noteworthy that
such an approach could still be inefficient due to the high I/O
complexity between the SGX and server. Like prior forward
and backward private SE studies, Amjad et al. also proposed
an efficient scheme (i.e., Type-II backward privacy [6]) that
trades a security for higher efficiency named Bunker-B [1].
Timestamps of update operations will be exposed, while the
rounds of interaction between the SGX and server can be
reduced. In this work, we are also interested in designs with
forward and Type-II backward privacy due to its efficiency.
Unfortunately, only the theoretical construction of Bunker-
B is given in [1], and we observe that it is still far from
being practical, especially when handling large datasets. First,
deletion operations are realised via insertion operations, which
will (a) incur large communication costs between the SGX and
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server, i.e., the number of ocalls scales with the number of
deletions, and (b) increase search latency, because all deleted
data needs to be retrieved, decrypted, and filtered out from
the search results. Second, re-encryption is adopted after each
search for forward and backward privacy, which will also incur
long search latency. The reason is that if deleted documents
are only a small portion of the matched results, most of the
results (non-deleted ones) need to be re-encrypted and re-
inserted to the database. More detailed analysis can be found
in Section VI.
To avoid the potential performance bottleneck introduced
by SGX, in this paper, we devise forward and backward
private SE schemes from a simple yet effective approach. Our
key idea is to leverage the SGX enclave to fully act as the
client. The enclave will cache both the keyword state and
the deletions, so as to reduce the communication cost and
roundtrips between the SGX and server in search, addition,
and deletion operations, and make the client almost free in
computation and storage. Furthermore, we propose several
optmisations to accelerate the performance, including batch
document processing, state compression via Bloom filter, and
memory efficient implementation.
Contributions: Our contributions in this paper can be sum-
marised as follows:
• We design and implement two forward and backward
private SE schemes, named SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2.
By using SGX, the communication cost between the
client and server of achieving forward and backward
privacy in SE is significantly reduced.
• Both SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 leverage the SGX en-
clave to carefully track keyword states and document
deletions, so as to minimise the communication overhead
between SGX and untrusted memory. In particular, SGX-
SE2 employs bloomfilter to compress the information
of deletions, which speeds up the search operations and
boosts the capacity of batch processing in addition and
deletion.
• We formalise the security model of our schemes and
perform security analysis accordingly.
• We conduct comprehensive evaluations on both synthetic
and real-world datasets. Our experiments show that the
latest art Bunker-B takes 10× more ecall/ocalls than our
schemes SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 when inserting 106
documents. Even more, Bunker-B needs 30× ecall/ocalls
when deleting 25% of the above documents. W.r.t. search
latency, SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 are 30% and 2× faster
than Bunker-B, respectively.
Organisation: We discuss some relevant works in Section II.
Section III present the background of SGX and dynamic SE.
Section IV details our system architecture, threat models,
design intuition, and presents our proposed schemes SGX-
SE1 and SGX-SE2. Section V formalises their security
analysis. In Section VI we evaluate the schemes with the prior
art in SGX-supported forward and backward private schemes.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Searchable encryption: Song et al. [37] presented the first
searchable encryption (SE) to enable search over encrypted
documents. After that, Curtmola et al. [16] and Kamara et
al. [28] formalised the security definitions for static and dy-
namic SE, respectively, and proposed schemes with sublinear
search time. Since SSE was formalised, a long line of studies
have been proposed to improve query efficiency [10], [13],
[19], [17], [20], and support expressive queries [42], [31], [18].
Forward and backward privacy in SE: In dynamic SE,
forward privacy means data additions do not reveal their
associations to any query made in the past, and deleted
documents cannot be access to any post queries. Forward
privacy has been studied widely to mitigate file-injection
attacks [45], [38], [4]. Backward privacy has received less
attention [6], [40], [24]. There are three types of backward
privacy from Type-I to Type-III in the descending order of
security. However, strong backward private (Type-I and Type-
II) schemes are known to be inefficient in both computation
and communication overhead, as shown in [6], [24].
Encrypted search with trusted execution: Another line of
research [1], [14], [33], [23] enabling search over encrypted
data is to leverage hardware-assisted trusted execution environ-
ment (TEEs). In general, TEE such as Intel SGX can reduce
the network roundtrips between the client and server and
enrich the database functions in the encrypted domain. Fuhry
et al. [23] proposed HardIDX that organises database index in
a B+-tree structure and utilises enclave to traverse a subset of
the tree nodes to do search. Later, Mishra et al. [33] designed a
doubly-oblivious SE scheme that supports inserts and deletes,
named Oblix. In the scheme, one oblivious data index resides
in enclave to map the search index of each keyword to a
location in the another oblivious structure located in untrusted
memory. However, the performance of their implementation
on large databases is less efficient due to the fact of using
ORAM. Regarding SE, Borges et al. [3] migrates secured
computation to enclave to improve the search efficiency of
SE boolean query schemes. When two or more keywords
are queries, their result set can be unionised or intersected
within the enclave. Note that this work focuses on a different
problem with ours. Very recently, Amjad et al. [1] proposed
three schemes to enable single-keyword query with different
search leakage (i.e., information that untrusted server can learn
about the query and data). However, the practical performance
of these schemes has not been investigated.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Intel SGX
Intel SGX [32] is a set of new x86 instructions that designed
for improving the security of application code and data. On
SGX-enabled platforms, ones need to partition the application
into both trusted part and untrusted part. The trusted part,
dubbed enclave, is located in a dedicated memory portion
of physical RAM with strong protection enforced by SGX.
The untrusted part is executed as an ordinary process and can
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invoke the enclave only through the well-defined interface,
named ecall, while the enclave can encrypt clear data and send
to untrusted code via the interface named ocall. Furthermore,
decryption and integrity checks are performed when the data
is loaded inside the enclave. All other software, including OS,
privileged software, hypervisor, and firmware cannot access
the enclave’s memory. In that way, outside applications (e.g.
malicious software) cannot learn the plaintext.
SGX’s enclave is constructed with very limited 128 MB
cache memory size. That memory is used for both SGX meta-
data and the enclave itself. The actual memory for storing data
in the enclave is only up to 96 MB. SGX will automatically
apply page swapping with proper integrity and confidentiality
guarantees when allocating more than 96 MB.
SGX has a remote attestation feature that allows to verify
the creation of enclaves on a remote server. During the
creation, initial code and data are loaded into the enclave for
measurement. Then, the enclave attests itself to the remote
provider via authentication checking. After that, an encrypted
communication channel can be established between the two
parties. Secrets such as credentials or sensitive data can be
provisioned directly to the enclave.
There has been a lot of existing SGX side-channel attacks
such as hardware side-channels [44], cache timing [8], [25],
[27], and page-fault attacks [36], [43]. However, we are
also aware that the security in future SGX versions will be
improved by both hardware and software based countermea-
sures [22]. For instance, Dr. SGX [7] provided new data ran-
domisation strategies to defence against side-channel attacks
that target data access patterns. Cloak [26] implements new
hardware transaction memory techniques to detect and prevent
adversarial observation of cache misses on the sensitive code
and data. Sanctum [15] and Varys [35] provide new verifiable
hardware/software extensions to mitigate page-fault attacks.
B. Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption
In this section, we briefly overview dynamic SE. More
details of forward and backward privacy are in [4], [6].
Following the verbatim in [4], [6], let DB represent a
database of documents, and each document doc with a unique
identifier id is a variable-length set of unique keywords. We
use DB(w) to present the set of documents where w occurs.
The total number of keyword-document pairs is denoted by
N , W is the total number of distinct keywords in DB. All N
keyword-document pairs are stored in an index MI , which is a
dictionary structure mapping each unique keyword w to a list
of matching documents in DB(w). The encrypted database,
named EDB is a collection of encrypted documents. A dy-
namic SE scheme Σ = (Setup,Search,Update) consists of
three protocols between a client and a server as follows:
Setup(1λ,DB): The protocol inputs a security parameter λ
and outputs a secret key K, a state ST for the client, and an
encrypted database EDB that will be sent to the server.
Search(K,w, ST ;EDB): The protocol allows to perform a
query on w based on the state ST , the secret key K and the
state ST from the client, and the encrypted database EDB
from the server. After that, it outputs the search result Res
matching w.
Update(K, (op, in), ST ;EDB): The protocol takes the secret
key K, the state ST , an input in associated with an op-
eration op from the client, and the database EDB, where
op ∈ {add, del} and in consists of a document identifier id
and a set of keywords in that document. Then, the protocol
inserts in to or removes in from EDB upon op.
Giving a list of queries Q sent by the client, the server
records the timestamps u for every query with Q = {q :
q = (u,w) or (u,op, in)}. Following the verbatim from [4],
[6], we let TimeDB(w) be the access pattern which consists
of the non-deleted documents currently matching w and the
timestamps of inserting them to the database. Formally,
TimeDB(w) = {(u, id) :(u, add, (w, id)) ∈ Q
and ∀u′, (u′, del, (w, id)) /∈ Q}
and let Updates(w) be the list of timestamps of updates:
Updates(w) = {u : (u,op, (w, id)) ∈ Q}
Based on the leakage function of dynamic SE [6], there are
two security properties. The forward privacy ensures that
each update leaks no information about the keyword that
was queried in the past and currently is in the document to
be updated. The backward privacy guarantees that when a
keyword-document pair (w, id) is added to and then deleted
from the database, subsequent searches on w do not reveal id.
There are three types of backward privacy with varying levels
of leakages from Type-I to Type-III introduced in [6]. Type-
I backward privacy is the most secure. It only reveals what
time the current (non-deleted) documents matching to w added
(i.e.,TimeDB(w)). Type-II additionally leaks what time up-
dates on w made, presented as {TimeDB(w),Updates(w)}.
In a less secure manner, Type-III inherits the leakage of
Type-II and additionally reveals which addition updates cancel
which deletion updates.
Current Type-II schemes Fides [6] and Mitra [24] require
multiple roundtrips and high communication cost, while Ho-
rus [24] relies on Path-ORAM [39]. Until recently, Amjad et
al. [1] proposed three SGX-supported schemes, including the
Type-I scheme Fort, Type-II scheme Bunker-B, and Type-III
scheme Bunker-A. However, Fort requires an oblivious map
(OMAP) similar to the one in Orion [24] to do the update,
causing high computation overhead. Bunker-A [1] improves
the update computation, but it downgrades the security guar-
antees. In contrast, Bunker-B is designed with good tradeoff
in computation/communication cost and security guarantees.
We will later compare the performance of Bunker-B with our
schemes in Section VI.
IV. OUR PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we present the high level SGX-supported
system of our proposed schemes, as shown in Fig.1. After
that, we detail our scheme design intuition by analysing
previous SGX-supported schemes [1] in terms of communi-
cation/computation overhead and then highlight our technical
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Fig. 1: High level design
solution. Finally, we present SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 with
corresponding protocols to resolve the recognised limitations.
A. System Overview
The design involves three entities: the client (who is the
data owner and therefore trusted), the untrusted server, and
the trusted SGX enclave within the server. The system flow
involves 9 steps.
At step 1, the client uses the SGX attestation feature for
authenticating the enclave and establishing a secure channel
between the client and the enclave. The client then provisions
a secret key K to the enclave through this channel. This
completes the Setup protocol of our proposed system. Note
that this operation does not deploy any EDB to the server as
in dynamic SE schemes [6], [5]. Instead, we consider that the
client should outsource documents to the server via Update
operations later.
At step 2, giving a document with a unique document
identifier id, the Client Manager encrypts the document with
the key K and sends the encrypted version of the document to
the Server Manager (see step 3). The encrypted version with
its id is then inserted to EDB. After that, the Client Manager
sends the original document to the State Manager located in
the enclave via the secure channel (see step 4). At this step,
the State Manager performs trusted cryptographic operations
to generate update tokens that will be sent to Server Manager
(see step 5). The tokens are used to update the encrypted
index of dynamic SE located in the Server Manager. Note that
traditional dynamic SE schemes [11], [6], [40] often consider
EDB as the underlying encrypted index of dynamic SE, and
omit the data structure storing encrypted documents. Here,
we locate them separately to avoid that ambiguity, i.e., the
index of dynamic SE MI is located in Server Manager, and
encrypted documents reside in EDB as an encrypted document
repository, respectively. To delete a document with a given id
(step 6), the Client Manager directly sends the document to
the State Manager (see step 7).
At step 8, the client wants to search documents matching
a given query keyword w. The Client Manager will send the
keyword w to the State Manager (see step 9). Then, the State
Manager computes query tokens and excludes the tokens for
deleted documents according to the deletion information from
step 6. Later, the State Manager sends them to the Server
Manager (in step 10). The Server Manager will search over
the received tokens and return the list of encrypted matching
documents back to the Client Manager. At that stage, the
encrypted documents are decrypted with K.
B. Assumptions and Threat Models
Our Assumptions with Intel SGX: We assume that SGX
behaves correctly, (i.e., there are no hardware bugs or back-
doors), and the preset code and data inside the enclave are
protected. Also, the communication between the client and
the enclave relies on the secure channel created during SGX
attestation. Like many other SGX applications [21], [33], we
consider side-channel attacks [44], [8], [25], [27], [36], [43]
against SGX are out of our scope. Denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks are also out of our focus, i.e., the enclave is always
available whenever the client invokes or queries. Finally, we
assume that all the used cryptographic primitives and libraries
of SGX are trusted.
Threat Models: Like existing work [23], [1], we consider a
semi-honest but powerful attacker at the server-side. Although
the attacker will not deviate from the protocol, he/she can
gain full access over software stack outside of the enclave,
OS and hypervisor, as well as hardware components in the
server except for the processor package and memory bus.
In particular, the attacker can observe memory addresses and
(encrypted) data on the memory bus, in memory, or in EDB to
generate data access patterns. Additionally, the attacker can log
the time when these memory manipulations happen. The goal
of the attacker is to learn extra information about the encrypted
database from the leakage both revealed by hardware and the
leakage function defined in Section V.
C. Design Intuition
As mentioned, Amjad et al. [1] proposed three backward
private SGX-supported schemes: the Type-I scheme Fort,
Type-II scheme Bunker-B, and Type-III scheme Bunker-A.
The performance and security overview of these schemes can
be found in Table I. Fort is the most secure while still relying
on ORAM and thus we exclude it in this work. Bunker-A
does not perform re-encryption and re-insertion after search
and thus only achieves Type-III backward privacy. However, it
still treats deletion as insertion, just like Bunker-B. Therefore,
we only analyse the limitations of Bunker-B as follows.
Performance Analysis of Prior Work: The Update and
Search protocols of Bunker-B are summarily presented in
Algorithm 1. As shown in Algorithm 1, Bunker-B only
requires O(1) update computation complexity and aw update
ocalls: For each (w, id), Bunker-B lets the enclave follow the
same routine to generate tokens for addition and deletion and
uses the generated token to update MI on the server (line 5 in
Algorithm 1). However, it causes high computation complexity
O(aw) and involves a large number of roundtrips (i.e., aw)
during the search. In the Search protocol, the core idea of
Bunker-B is to let the enclave read all records (associated
with add or del) in MI corresponding to the keyword. Then,
the enclave decrypts them and filters deleted ids based on the
operation. After query, the enclave re-encrypts non-deleted ids
and sends the newly generated tokens to the server for updates.
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TABLE I: Comparison with previous SGX-supported schemes. N , D, and W denote the total number of keyword/document
pairs, total number of documents, and total number of keywords, respectively. d presents the number of deleted documents.
nw is the number of (current, non-deleted) documents containing w, aw is the total number of entries (including addition and
deletion updates) performed on w, dw denotes the number of deletions performed on w. r is the predefined number of necessary
dummy entries to be inserted in oblivious operations. vd denotes the vector of a Bloom filter to verify the membership of #d
documents.
SGX Schemes
Communication between enclave and server Enclave Computation Client Enclave BP#Search rounds Search #Update Update Search Update(ecall + ocall) ocalls Storage Storage Type
Fort [1] aw O(nw) (aw + r) O(1) O(nw +
∑
w dw) O(log
2N) O(W logD) – I
Bunker-B [1] aw O(nw) aw O(1) O(aw) O(1) O(W logD) – II
SGX-SE1 (d + dw)? O(nw) nw† O(1) O(nw + d)‡ O(1) – O(W logD + d) II
SGX-SE2 (dw)? O(nw) nw† O(1) O(nw + vd) O(1) – O(W logD) ? ? II
Bunker-A [1] aw O(nw) aw O(1) O(aw) O(1) O(W logD) – III
?: The complexity also requires nw ocalls (one-way trip) when sending query tokens to the server.
??: The complexity also requires the size of a configurable Bloom filter vector.
†: We note that the number of update ocalls is nw if the update is addition. Otherwise, deletion updates do not take any ocalls.
‡: If there is no deletion updates between two searches on different w, d is cancelled. Then, the complexity is only O(nw).
These steps are summarised in lines 21-25 in Algorithm 1. We
have implemented Bunker-B (see Section VI) and found that
the scheme also has other limitations in practice as follows:
Intensive Ecall/Ocall Usage: Giving a document doc with
an identifier id and M unique keywords to the server, Bunker-
B repeatedly performs the Update protocol by using M ecalls
and then the same number of ocalls to insert tokens to the
index map MI . It indicates that the number of ecall/ocall
for Bunker-B is linear to the keyword-document pairs for
updates. In practice, a dataset can include a large number of
keyword-document pairs (> 107). As a result, Bunker-B takes
12µs to insert one (w, id) pair, and 2.36× 107 ecall/ocalls to
insert 106 documents to the database. Similarly, deleting a doc
in Bunker-B is the same as the addition, with the exception
that the tokens contain op = del. Experimentally, Bunker-B
takes 1.98× 108 ecall/ocalls to delete 2.5× 105 documents.
The practical performance of Bunker-B can be found in
Section VI. We also note that Bunker-B only supports deletion
updates on the index map MI without considering deleting
real documents. To do so, Bunker-B will need additional dw
ocalls to request the server for the document deletion. This
communication overhead is not mentioned in the previous
work [1].
Search Latency: The re-encryption on non-deleted ids per
search makes Bunker-B inefficient. In particular, when the
number of those ids is large and the deleted ones is a small
portion (adding 106 documents and deleting 25% documents),
Bunker-B takes 3.2s to query a keyword (see Section VI).
Technical Highlights: Motivated by the above limitations of
Bunker-B, we design SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 that are Type-
II backward private schemes with: (1) reduced number of
ecall/ocall when the client wants to add/delete a document,
(2) reduced search roundtrips, and (3) accelerated enclave’s
computation in search.
We achieve (1) by allowing the client to transfer the
document to the enclave for document addition, instead of
transferring (w, id) pairs. This design reduces the number
Algorithm 1: Bunker-B [1]: Update and Search protocols
1 Update(op, in) : // op ∈ {add, del}, in = (w, id)
2 Client retrieves stw = (version, count) from st;
3 Send (w, version, count, op, id) to enclave;
4 Client updates stw = (version, count+ 1) to st;
5 Enclave generates an update token utk = (u, v):
u := FK1(w||version||count+ 1)
v := Enc(K2, id||op)
6 Enclave sends utk to the server;
7 Server receives utk = (u, v) from the enclave;
8 Server updates the map MI [u] = v
9 Search(w) :
10 Client retrieves stw = (version, count) from st;
11 Client outputs (w, version, count) to enclave st;
12 Client updates stw = (version+ 1, count) to st;
13 Enclave receives (w, version, count) from client;
14 Enclave generates query tokens
qtk = (u1, . . . , ui, . . . , ucount), where :
15 ui := FK1(w||version||i)
16 Enclave sends qtk to the server;
17 Server returns to the enclave with the list
L = {(u1, v1), . . . , (uc, vc)};
18 Server deletes all pairs in the L from MI ;
19 Enclave filters non-deleted ids with
R = {id : @(id, op = del) ∈ L};
20 Enclave returns R to the client;
21 Enclave resets count = 1 and re-encrypts R with
foreach id ∈ R: Generate a new token
22 u := FK1(w||version+ 1||count)
23 v := Enc(K2, id||op = add)
24 Send (u, v) to the server to update MI ;
25 Enclave increase count+ = 1;
of ecalls to 1. We then use the enclave to store the latest
states ST of all keywords, where the state of a keyword
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w is ST [w] = count. With this design, the enclave is able
to generate addition tokens based on ST . Our experiments
(see Section VI) show that this design improves 2× the
addition throughput compared to Bunker-B. We note that it is
negligible to store ST in the enclave since it costs less than
6 MB to store the states of all keywords in the American
dictionary of English1 (assuming each keyword state item
can take up 18 bytes in a dictionary map). Additionally, our
schemes only require 1 ecall if the client wants to delete a
document, by transferring that document id to the enclave.
The SGX-SE1 scheme reduces the search roundtrips be-
tween the enclave and the server to (d+ dw). The basic idea
behind SGX-SE1 is to let the enclave cache the mapping
between w and the deleted document ids. In particular, the
enclave loads and decrypts d deleted documents to extract
the mapping (w, id). It cleans the memory after loading each
deleted document to avoid the memory bottleneck. After that,
the enclave needs dw roundtrips to retrieve the counters when
the enclave filters those deleted ids. SGX-SE2 is more optimal
by requiring only dw roundtrips without the need for loading d
deleted documents. To do this, SGX-SE2 uses a Bloom filter
BF to store the mapping (w, id) within the enclave. Note that
the BF can track 1.18×107 (w, id) pairs with the storage cost
of 34 MB enclave memory2 with the false positive probability
Pe = 10
−4. Our experiments (see Section VI) show that the
search latency of SGX-SE1 is 30% faster than Bunker-B
after inserting 106 documents and caching 2.5 × 105 deleted
documents. Moreover, SGX-SE2 is 2× faster than Bunker-B
for the query after deleting 25% documents.
The proposed SGX-SE1 scheme improves the search com-
putation complexity to O(nw+d). We note that the complexity
is even amortised if there is no deletion updates between a
sequence of queries. The reason is that the enclave only loads
d document for the first query to update the mapping of all
keywords in ST with the deleted documents. Furthermore, the
search computation complexity of SGX-SE2 is only O(nw).
We note that testing the membership of d documents in the
BF is vd where v is the vector of BF. Our experiments
(see Section VI) show that Bunker-B takes 3.2s for queries
after inserting 106 documents and deleting 25% documents
while SGX-SE1 only takes 2.4s after caching those deleted
documents. In addition, SGX-SE2 spends the least time (i.e.,
1.4 s), which is 2× faster than Bunker-B.
D. SGX-SE1 Construction
The basic idea behind SGX-SE1 is to let the enclave store
the latest states ST of keywords and keeps the list d of
deleted document ids, in order to facilitate searches. Then, the
enclave only loads the deleted documents for the first search
between two deletion updates to update the mapping between
deleted ids and tracked keywords. Subsequent searches be-
tween the two deletion updates do not require loading the
deleted documents again. We note that the enclave clearly
1The dictionary contains about 300,000 common and obsolete keywords
21.18 × 107 pairs ≈ 386× Hamlet tragedy written by William Shake-
speare
needs to remove d after retrieving them in the first query
to save the enclave’s storage. Once the enclave knows the
mapping between the query keyword and deleted documents,
it infers the mapping of the query keyword with the rest non-
deleted documents, in order to generate query tokens. After
that, the server retrieves documents based on the received
tokens and returns the document result list to the client. The
detail protocols of SGX-SE1 can be found in Figure 2. We
explain the protocols further as follows:
In setup, client communicates with enclave upon an es-
tablished secure channel to provision K = (KΣ, kf ) where
KΣ enables enclave to generate update/query tokens and kf
is the symmetric key for document encryption/decryption. The
enclave maintains the maps ST and D, and the list d, where
ST stores the states of keywords, D presents the mapping
between keywords and deleted documents, and d is the array
of deleted ids. The server holds an encrypted index MI , the
map of encrypted state Mc, and the repository R with R[id]
stores the encrypted document of document identifier id.
In update, the client receives a tuple (op, in), where it
could be (op = add, in = (doc, id)) or (op = del, in = id).
If the update is addition, the client encrypts doc by using
kf and sends that encrypted document to server. After that,
the client sends (op, in) to the enclave. The enclave will
then parse doc to retrieve the list L of {(w, id)}. For each
w, the enclave generates kw and kc from KΣ, and retrieves
the latest state c ← ST [w]. The enclave will then generate
kid from c by using H1(kw, c) with H1 is a hash function.
After that, the enclave uses kw, kc, and kid to generate
encrypted entries (u, v) and (u′, v′) for w. In particular, the
first encrypted entry, with (u, v)← (H2(kw, c),Enc(kid, id)),
holds the mapping between c and id to allows the server
retrieves id based on given u and kid. The second encrypted
entry, with (u′, v′)← (H3(kw, id),Enc(kc, c)), hides the state
c of documents. In this way, the client can retrieve the state
c of deleted documents upon sending u′ in search operation.
In our protocols, H1 and H2 are hash functions, and Enc is a
symmetric encryption cipher. We note that enclave only sends
a batch of (T1, T2) to the server within one ocall per a doc-
ument addition, where T1 = {(uw1 , vw1), . . . , (uw|L| , vw|L|)}
and T2 = {(u′w1 , v′w1), . . . , (u′w|L| , v′w|L|)}}. Then, the server
will update T1 and T2 to MI and Mc, respectively. If the
update is deletion, the enclave simply updates d by the deleted
id without further computation or communication to the server.
In search, the client sends a query q containing w to the
enclave via the secure channel and expects to receive all the
current (non-deleted) documents matching w from the server.
The enclave begins loading deleted encrypted documents in
d from the server in a sequential manner. By using kf , the
enclave decrypts those documents for checking the existence
of w, and updating D[w] if applicable. By leveraging D[w],
the enclave can retrieve the state list stwc = {cdelid }, where
cdelid is the state used when the enclave added the deleted
document id for w. After that, the enclave simply infers the
states of non-deleted documents by excluding stwc from the
set of {0, . . . , ST [w]}. Finally, the enclave will compute the
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Setup(1λ)
Client:
1: kΣ, kf
$←− {0, 1}λ;
2: Launch a remote attestation;
3: Establish a secure channel;
4: Output K = (kΣ, kf ) to Enclave;
Enclave:
5: Initialise maps ST and D;
6: Initialise a list d;
7: Initialise tuples T1 and T2;
8: Receive K = (kΣ, kf ) from Client;
Server:
9: Initialise maps MI and Mc;
10: Initialise an empty repository R;
Update(op,in)
Client:
1: send (op,in) to Enclave
2: if op = add then
3: f ← Enc(kf ,doc);
4: send (id, f ) to Server;
Enclave:
5: if op = add then
6: {(w, id)} ← Parse(in);
7: foreach (w, id) do
8: kw ‖ kc ← F (kΣ, w);
9: c← ST [w];
10: if c =⊥ then c = −1;
11: c← c+ 1;
12: kid ← H1(kw, c);
13: (u, v)← (H2(kw, c),Enc(kid, id));
14: add (u, v) to T1;
15: (u′, v′)← (H3(kw, id),Enc(kc, c));
16: add (u′, v′) to T2;
17: ST [w]← c;
18: end foreach
19: send (T1, T2) to Server;
20: reset T1 and T2;
21: else // op = del
22: add id to d;
23: end if
Server:
24: // if op = add
25: receive (id, f ) from Client;
26: R[id]← f ; // add encrypted doc
27: receive (T1,T2) from Enclave;
28: foreach (u, v) in T1 do
29: MI [u]← v;
30: end foreach
31: foreach (u′, v′) in T2 do
32: Mc[u′]← v′;
33: end foreach
34: // if op = del then do nothing
Search(w)
Client:
1: send w to Enclave;
Enclave:
2: stwc ← {∅}, Qw ← {∅};
3: kw ‖ kc ← F (kΣ, w);
4: foreach idi in d do
5: fi ← R[idi];//get encrypted doc
6: doci ← Dec(kf , fi);
7: if w in doci then
8: D[w]← idi ∪D[w];
9: delete R[idi]; // delete doc
10: end if
11: end foreach
12: foreach id in D[w] do
13: u′ ← H3(kw, id);
14: v′ ←Mc[u′];
15: c← Dec(kc, v′);
16: stwc ← {c} ∪ stwc ;
17: delete Mc[u′];
18: end foreach
19: stwc ← {0, . . . , ST [w]} \ stwc
20: foreach c in stwc do
21: u← H2(kw, c);
22: kid ← H1(kw, c);
23: Qw ← {(u, kid)} ∪Qw;
24: end foreach
25: send Qw to Server;
26: delete D[w];
Server:
27: receive Qw from Enclave;
28: Res← ∅; // file collection
29: foreach (ui, kidi) in Qw do
30: idi ← Dec(kidi ,MI [ui]);
31: doci ← R[idi];
32: add doci to Res;
33: end foreach
34: send Res to Client;
Client:
35: decrypt Res with kf ;
Fig. 2: Protocols in SGX-SE1. In Update, weak backward privacy (i.e., type-III) can be achieved by letting the enclave
queries the deleted document from S to update D. If there are no deletion updates between two searches, the enclave records
the deleted id to other keywords in D[w].
query token u and kid for these non-deleted documents, and
send the list Qw = {(u, kid)} to the server. At the server,
upon receiving Qw, it can retrieve idi when decrypting MI [ui]
with kidi . Finally, the server returns the encrypted documents
Res = {R[idi]} to the client.
Efficiency of SGX-SE1: In update, SGX-SE1 only takes
nw ocalls to add all n documents containing w to the server,
and no ocall for deletion due to the caching of deleted
documents within the enclave. That efficiency outperforms
Bunker-B since the latter requires an additional ocall per a
deletion. However, we note that the asymptotic performance
of SGX-SE1 is affected by (d + dw) search roundtrips.
In particular, the enclave needs to load and decrypt deleted
documents within the enclave. Thus, the search performance
really depends on how large the number of deleted documents
is at the query time. We will later compare our search latency
with Bunker-B in Section VI.
E. SGX-SE2 Construction
According to Table I, SGX-SE1 has (d + dw) search
roundtrips and non-trivial O(nw+d) computation. One down-
side is that the enclave needs to spend time on decrypting
deleted documents. Here, we present SGX-SE2, an advanced
version of SGX-SE1, that reduces search roundtrips to dw
and achieves better asymptotic and concrete search time
O(nw + vd). The main solution we make to SGX-SE2 is
that we use a Bloom filter BF within the enclave to verify the
mapping between query keyword w and deleted document ids.
In this way, SGX-SE2 avoids loading them from the server.
Since BF is a probabilistic data structure, we can configure it
to achieve a negligible false positive rate Pe (see Section VI).
In Algorithm 2, we highlight the solution of SGX-SE2. We
summarily introduce SGX-SE2 as follows:
In setup, SGX-SE2 is almost the same with that one in
SGX-SE1 with the exception that the client also requires to
initialise the parameters of BF. They are, kBF , b and h, where
kBF is the key for computing the hashed value of (w||id),
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Algorithm 2: Protocols in SGX-SE2. The new instructions of
SGX-SE2 is in blue
1 Setup(1λ):
2 Performs the same Setup in SGX-SE1;
3 Client initialises kBF
$←− {0, 1}λ and integers b, h;
4 Client provisions (kBF , b, h) to enclave;
5 Enclave selects {H ′j}j∈[h] for BF ;
6 Enclave initialises BF ← 0b;
7 Enclave does not maintain D;
8 Update(op, in) :
9 Performs the same Update in SGX-SE1;
10 if op=add then
11 for (w, id) do
12 for j = 1 : h do
13 h′j(w, id)
∆
= H ′j(kBF , w ‖ id))
14 BF [h′j(w, id)]← 1;
15 end
16 end
17 end
18 Search(w) :
19 Replacing lines 4-18 in Search in SGX-SE1 with
following lines 20-29:
20 for id ∈ d do
21 if BF [H ′j(kBF , w ‖ id)]j∈[h] = 1 then
22 u′ ← H3(kw, id);
23 v′ ←Mc[u′];
24 c← Dec(kc, v′);
25 stwc ← {c} ∪ stwc ;
26 delete Mc[u′];
27 delete R[id]; // delete doc
28 end
29 end
and b is the number of bits in the BF vector (i.e, vector size),
and h is the number of hash functions. Upon receiving the
BF setting, the enclave initialises the BF vector and the set
of hash functions {H ′j}j∈[h]. In SGX-SE2, the mapping D
between keywords and deleted ids is no longer needed within
the enclave like that one in SGX-SE1.
In update, SGX-SE2 is also similar with SGX-SE1.
However, if the update is addition, the enclave will compute
a new member H ′j(kBF , w ‖ id) to update BF.
In search, SGX-SE2 verifies the mapping between query
keyword w and deleted ids by checking the membership of
(w||id) with BF. If the mapping is valid, SGX-SE2 performs
the same as SGX-SE1 to retrieve the state list stwc = {cdelid },
where cdelid is the state used for deleted ids. After that,
the enclave infers the states of non-deleted documents and
computes query tokens to send to the server.
Efficiency of SGX-SE2: The scheme clearly outperforms
SGX-SE1 in terms of search computation and communication
roundtrips due to the usage of the Bloom filter. It avoids
loading d deleted documents into the enclave, making the
search roundtrip only dw. The scheme is even more efficient
when |d| is large. The reason is that the cost of verifying a
membership (w||id) is always O(1) under the fixed BF setting.
We note that checking d members in the BF is still more
efficient than loading/decrypting their real documents. BF is
also memory-efficiently; therefore, one can configure its size to
balance the enclave memory with the demand of large datasets.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The only difference between SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 in
term of security is that SGX-SE1 requires to load encrypted
deleted documents to the enclave during the search. Therefore,
our following analysis is almost identical to both schemes. We
will state the difference between them wherever is necessary.
We denote D as our general scheme that could be SGX-
SE1 or SGX-SE2. The security of D can be quantified via
a stateful leakage function L = (LStp,LUpdt,LSrch,Lhw).
The first three components define the information exposed
in Setup, Update, and Search, respectively. The latter one,
Lhw, defines the inherent leakage of the used SGX enclave
with the outputs from the enclave to the server. We now define
L and then formalise our security with analysis.
In Setup, D leaks nothing to the server except the data
structure of MI (i.e., the encrypted index), Mc (i.e., the
encrypted map of keyword states), R (i.e., the empty repository
of encrypted documents).
In Update(op = add, in), D leaks the data access pattern of
encrypted entries to be inserted in MI , Mc, and R. Otherwise,
if op = del, D leaks nothing under the secure channel
established in Setup. Hence,
LUpdt({(op, in)}) = {(T1, T2, R[idi])}
where T1 = {(u, v)} and T2 = {(u′, v′)} present the
collections of entries to be inserted in MI and Mc respectively,
and R[idi] denotes an encrypted document to be inserted in
R with label idi.
In Search(w), D leaks 1) the access pattern on Mc when
the enclave queries the deleted states of w, named apMc(w), 2)
the access pattern on Mc when the enclave queries non-deleted
ids, named apMI (w), if D is SGX-SE1, and 3) the pattern
on deleted documents dw, named apR(dw). Then, formally
LSrch(w) = apMc(w) + apMI (w) + [apR(dw)]
We define Lhw(MI ,Mc, R) as the hardware leakage during
Update and Search. That includes memory access and loca-
tion, the time log, and the size of the manipulated memory
area.
Lhw(MI ,Mc, R) = (MI ,Mc, R)Updt + (MI ,Mc, R)Srch
This function outputs the trace τ of (l, T, v, t), where l is the
label input, T is a map data structure that could be MI , Mc,
and R, v is the value at T [l], and t is the time access of op.
W.r.t. SGX-SE1, if l is an id, the function will output the
encrypted document e and the document size |e|.
Definition 1: Let D denote our scheme that consists of
three protocols Setup, Update, and Search. Consider the
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probabilistic experiments RealA(λ) and IdealA,S(λ), whereas
A is a stateful adversary, and S is a stateful simulator that gets
the leakage function L.
RealA(λ): The challenger runs Setup(1λ) that involves
the client, the enclave, and the server to initialise neces-
sary data structures as presented in Figure. 2. A chooses a
database DB = {doci}i∈Z and makes a polynomial number
of updates (addition/deletion) with (op, in), where Z is a
natural number of documents, and (op = add, in = doci)
or (op = del, in = idi). Accordingly, the challenger runs
those updates with Update(op, in) and eventually returns
the tuple (MI ,Mc, R)Updt to A. After that, A adaptively
chooses the keyword w (resp., (op, in)) to search (resp.,
update). In response, the challenger runs Search(w) (resp.,
Update(op,in)) and returns the transcript of each operation.
The challenger also returns (MI ,Mc, R)Srch to A. Finally, A
outputs a bit b.
IdealA,S(λ): A chooses a DB = {doci}i∈Z . By using
LUpdt and (MI ,Mc, R)Updt, S creates a tuple of (MI ,Mc, R)
and passes it to A. Then, A adaptively chooses the key-
word w (resp., (op, in)) to search (resp., update). The chal-
lenger returns the transcript simulated by S(LSrch(w)) (resp.,
S(LUpdt(op, in))) with (MI ,Mc, R)Srch. Finally, A returns a
bit b.
We say D is L-secure against adaptive chosen-keyword
attacks if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A,
there exist a PPT simulator S such that
|Pr[RealA(λ) = 1]− Pr[IdealA,S(λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ)
Theorem 1: The scheme D presented above is L-secure
according to Def 1.
We now prove Theorem 1 by describing a PPT simulator S
for which a PPT adversary A can distinguish RealA(λ) and
IdealA,S(λ) with negligible probability.
Proof: S first generates a random key K˜ = (k˜Σ, k˜f ) to
simulate the key components that the enclave contains (see
Figure 2). Then, A executes Search(w) with w, which is a
random keyword, in order to obtain a query token q sent by
the enclave. Then, A simulates addition tokens a for w based
on K˜ and Lhw(MI ,Mc, R), and sends them to the enclave to
receive the new update of (MI ,Mc, R). However, A cannot
map which update token in a relates to q. The reason is that
the enclave keeps increasing the state ST [w]. Hence, A cannot
distinguish between the output of RealA(λ) and the simulated
output in Update and Search (forward privacy).
During Search, if there were delete updates made in the
past on deleted documents d with identifier list {idi},A cannot
know which keywords are inside the encrypted doc R[idi].
Also, A does not know when delete updates made since the
enclave only requests d during Search. The apMc(w) does
not reveal idi (see Search in Fig 2). However, A knows the
time when the entry relating idi added to apMc via Lhw, and
how many idi in d. Clearly, at the end of the protocol A
knows how many current (non-deleted) id accessed. Hence,
D is type-II backward privacy.
TABLE II: Statistics of the datasets used in the evaluation.
Name # of keywords # of docs # of keyword-doc pairs
Synthesis 1, 000 1, 000, 000 11, 879, 100
Enron 29, 627 517, 401 37, 219, 800
TABLE III: Average time (µs) for adding a keyword-doc pair
under different schemes.
# of docs # of keyword-doc pairs BunkerB SGX-SE1 SGX-SE2
2.5× 105 2.5× 105 21 23 26
5× 105 6.5× 105 19 19 21
7.5× 105 1.9× 106 15 12 14
1× 106 1.18× 107 12 7 8
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Experiment setup and implementation: For evaluation, we
choose two datasets: One is a synthesis dataset (3.2 GB)
generated from the English keyword frequency data based on
the Zipf’s law distribution, and the other one is the Enron
email dataset (1.4 GB). A summary of the statistical features
of the datasets is given in Table II.
We build the prototype of SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 using
C++ and the Intel SGX SDK. In addition, we implement the
prototype of Bunker-B as the baseline for comparisons, since
its implementation is not publicly available. The prototype
leverages the built-in cryptographic primitives in the SGX
SDK to support the required cryptographic operations. It also
uses the settings and APIs from the SDK to create, manage
and access the application (enclave) designed for SGX. Recall
that the SGX can only handle 96 MB memory within the
enclave. Access to the extra memory space triggers the paging
mechanism of the SGX, which brings an extra cost to the
system (average 5× as reported in [41]). To avoid paging
in our prototype, our prototypes are implemented with batch
processing to tackle with the keyword-document pairs, which
splits a huge memory demand into multiple batches with
smaller resource requests. The batch processing enables our
prototypes to handle queries with large memory demands.
On the other hand, the prototype should avoid too many
ecalls/ocalls as it incurs the I/O communication cost between
the untrusted and the trusted application (enclave). In the
following experiments, we set the batch size to 100, 000 for all
schemes, which can avoid triggering paging while minimising
the number of ecall/ocall in the system.
The prototypes are deployed in a workstation equipped with
SGX-enabled CPU (Intel Core i7-8850H 2.6 GHz) and 32 GB
RAM.
A. Performance evaluation on the synthesis dataset
Insertion and deletion: First, we evaluate the time for in-
sertion and deletion under three different schemes. In this
evaluation, we follow a reversed Zipf’s law distribution to
generate the encrypted database of our synthesis dataset, and
we measure the runtime for adding one keyword-document
pair into the encrypted database of different schemes. As
shown in Table II, Bunker-B takes 21 µs to insert one pair,
which is faster than our schemes (23 µs and 26 µs) when
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the number of keyword-document pairs equals the number of
documents. The reason is that the insertion time of the above
three schemes is bounded by the I/O (ecall/ocall) between
the untrusted application and the enclave. For Bunker-B, the
I/O cost is linear to the number of keyword-document pairs
(see Sec.IV-C for details), while the one for our schemes
is linear to the number of documents. Also, our schemes
involve more computations (PRF, Hash) and maintain more
data structures (Bloom filter), which require more time to be
processed. Nonetheless, when inserting 1 × 106 documents,
our schemes only require 7 µs and 8 µs respectively to
insert one keyword-document pair, which is 2× faster than
Bunker-B (12 µs). In the above case, the number of keyword-
document pairs is 10× larger than the number of documents,
which implies that Bunker-B needs 10× more I/O operations
(ecall/ocall) to insert the whole dataset comparing to our
schemes (see Table IV for details). Note that the real-world
document typically consists of more than one keyword. Hence,
our schemes are more efficient than Bunker-B when dealing
with a real-world dataset (see Section VI-B).
For deletion, the performance of Bunker-B is identical to
that for insertion (12 µs), because deletion runs the same
algorithm with different operations. For our schemes, the
deletion process only inserts the document id into a list, and
the deletion operation is executed by excluding the deleted id
during the query phase. Thus, our schemes only need 4 µs to
process one document in the deletion phase.
Query delay: Next, we report the query delay comparison
between Bunker-B and our schemes to show the advantage of
using SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2. To measure the query delay
introduced by keyword frequency and the deletion operation,
we choose to query the top-25 keywords after deleting a por-
tion of documents. In our first evaluation, we insert 2.5× 105
documents and delete 25%, 50% and 75% of the documents,
respectively. Fig. 3a illustrates the query delays when deleting
25% of documents: For the most frequent keyword, Bunker-
B needs 1.3 s to query while SGX-SE2 only needs 654 ms.
Although SGX-SE1 takes 5 s to perform the first search, it
also caches the deleted keyword-document pairs inside the
enclave and performs deletion on documents during the first
query. As a result, the rest of the queries are much faster, as the
number of ocalls is significantly reduced (900 µs if we query
the most frequent keyword again). Even for the 25-th most
frequent keyword, SGX-SE1 (159 ms) and SGX-SE2 (155
ms) are still 40% faster than Bunker-B (221 ms). Bunker-B
is always slower than SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 in the above
case as it requires to re-encrypt the remaining 75% documents
after each query. Compared to Bunker-B, SGX-SE1 and
SGX-SE2 only access the deleted 25% files and exclude
the corresponding token of deleted files before sending the
token list (see Section IV-E). With the increase of the deletion
portion, the difference of the query delay between our schemes
and Bunker-B becomes smaller as Bunker-B has fewer doc-
uments to be re-encrypted after queries. When 75% of the
documents are deleted, our schemes still outperform Bunker-
B when querying the keywords with a higher occurrence rate
TABLE IV: Number of ecall/ocall for adding 1 × 106 docu-
ments for different schemes.
# of calls BunkerB SGX1 SGX2
ecall 1.18× 107 1× 106 1× 106
ocall 1.18× 107 1× 106 1× 106
TABLE V: Number of ecall/ocall for deleting a portion of
documents after adding 1× 106 documents.
Deletion % BunkerB SGX1 SGX2ecall ocall ecall ocall ecall ocall
25% 9.9× 106 9.9× 106 2.5× 105 0 2.5× 105 0
50% 1.12× 107 1.1× 107 5× 105 0 5× 105 0
75% 1.16× 107 1.16× 107 7.5× 105 0 7.5× 105 0
TABLE VI: Number of ecall/ocall when querying the most
frequent keyword after adding 1×106 documents and deleting
a portion of them.
Deletion % BunkerB SGX1 SGX2ecall ocall ecall ocall ecall ocall
25% 1 21 1 250, 011?/11 1 11
50% 1 20 1 500, 010?/10 1 10
75% 1 21 1 750, 011?/11 1 11
?: It includes the ocall for caching and deleting the encrypted documents.
(see Fig. 3c). However, their performances are almost the same
when querying the 25-th most frequent keyword, i.e., about
400 ms for three schemes, because Bunker-B only re-encrypts
a tiny amount of document id (almost 0).
The second evaluation shows the query delay when inserting
all 1 × 106 documents into the encrypted database. The
major difference between this experiment and the previous
one is that the SGX-SE1 scheme requires more than 128
MB to cache the deleted documents, which triggers paging.
As shown in Fig. 4a, SGX-SE1 needs 10 s to cache the
deleted documents. When processing the query that contains
a large number of documents (e.g., the second most frequent
keyword), SGX-SE1 (2.4 s) is almost 2× slower than SGX-
SE2 (1.4 s). Nonetheless, their query performance is still
better than Bunker-B, which takes 3.2 s to answer the above
query. When our schemes delete a larger portion of documents
(see Fig 4b and Fig.4c), the query delay of SGX-SE1 and
SGX-SE2 is very close, since SGX-SE1 only refers to the
small deletion information cached in the enclave while SGX-
SE2 requires to check the Bloom filter for each deleted
document.
Communication cost: The next evaluation demonstrates the
impact of I/O operation (ecall/ocall) on the performance of
different schemes. As shown in Table IV, Bunker-B needs
10× more ecall/ocall operations than our schemes. Conse-
quently, although both Bunker-B and our schemes generate
and store the encrypted keyword-document pairs at the end,
our schemes can achieve a better performance for insertion,
because our schemes rely on less I/O operations. This result
is consistent with the average insertion time reported in the
insertion and deletion part. In terms of the deletion operation,
Bunker-B needs almost 30× more I/O operation than ours
(see Table V). Moreover, the deletion in our schemes only
10
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
The i-th most frequent keyword
0
2000
4000
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Bunker-B
SGX-SE1
SGX-SE2
(a) 25% deletion
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
The i-th most frequent keyword
0
2000
4000
6000
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Bunker-B
SGX-SE1
SGX-SE2
(b) 50% deletion
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
The i-th most frequent keyword
0
2000
4000
6000
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
Bunker-B
SGX-SE1
SGX-SE2
(c) 75% deletion
Fig. 3: The query delay of querying the i-th most frequent keyword in the synthesis dataset under different schemes (insert
2.5× 105 documents and delete a portion of them).
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Fig. 4: The query delay of querying the i-th most frequent keyword in the synthesis dataset under different schemes (insert
1× 106 documents and delete a portion of them).
requires to insert the deleted id, which does not involve any
cryptographic operation, whereas Bunker-B executes the same
procedure as insertion. This indicates that our schemes also
have less communication cost than Bunker-B. We further
present the number of ecall/ocall involved during the query
process in Table VI. Note that we implement batch processing
for all schemes, so each ocall can process 105 query tokens
at the same time. The result shows that Bunker-B has more
ocall during the query process because it needs to issue tokens
to query all document id as well as the deleted document.
After that, it should issue additional tokens to re-encrypt the
undeleted documents. On the other hand, our schemes keep the
state map within the enclave, which indicates that our schemes
do not require to retrieve all the document id via ocall. In
most of the case, Bunker-B has 2× more I/O operations
than our schemes except for the cache stage of SGX-SE1.
Despite the fact that SGX-SE1 takes more than 105 ocalls
to perform caching, we stress that this is a one-time cost; it
also enables our scheme to remove the document physically,
whereas Bunker-B only can delete the document from the
encrypted index.
Memory consumption: Finally, we present the memory
consumption of three different schemes. Since the memory
consumption on the client is negligible comparing to that for
the server and enclave (i.e., less than 1 MB). As shown in
Fig. 5, the encrypted database on the server always keeps
unchanged for SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 because they keep
the same keyword-document pairs after adding 1 × 106 doc-
uments. On the other hand, the memory usage of Bunker-
B keeps increasing when we delete more documents as it
should maintain the deleted keyword-document pairs on the
server. Within the enclave, Bunker-B does not maintain any
persistent data structure while SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 need
TABLE VII: Average time (µs) for adding a keyword-doc
pair from Enron dataset and removing 25% documents under
different schemes.
Operation BunkerB SGX-SE1 SGX-SE2
Insertion 12 7 8
Deletion (25%, 129,305 documents) 12 4 4
to store the necessary information for deletion. For SGX-SE1,
it caches all the document id in the enclave, which leads to
notably high memory usage (e.g., 304 MB when deleting 25%
documents, and 355 MB when deleting 75%). The memory
resource requests in SGX-SE1 triggers the paging mechanism
of the SGX, resulting in a larger query delay as presented
above. SGX-SE2 successfully prevents the paging by using
the Bloom filter. After applying a Bloom filter with the false
positive rate 10−4, SGX-SE2 only needs 34 MB to store all
keyword-document pairs (1.18 × 107 pairs) and maintains a
low query delay over the large dataset.
B. Performance evaluation on the Enron dataset
We use a real world dataset to illustrate the practicality
of the proposed scheme. Since the bulk deletion (e.g. delete
50%) is rare in the real world, we only focus on the setting
with a small deletion portion. Therefore, in the following
experiments, we insert the whole Enron dataset and test the
average runtime for insertion/deletion as well as the query
delay with a small deletion portion (25%).
Insertion and deletion: As described in Section VI-A, our
schemes are more efficient for the insertion and deletion if the
number of keyword-document pairs is larger than the number
of documents. The evaluation result on the Enron dataset
further verifies our observation: as shown in Table VII, our
schemes only need 7 µs and 8 µs respectively to insert one
keyword-document pair while Bunker-B needs 12 µs to do
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Fig. 5: The query delay of querying the i-th most frequent keyword in the synthesis dataset under different schemes (insert
1000000 documents and delete a portion of them).
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keyword in the Enron dataset under different schemes (insert
all documents and delete 25% of them).
that. Besides, both of SGX-SE1 and SGX-SE2 only takes
4 µs to delete one document, but Bunker-B still requires 12 µs
to execute the same algorithm as the insertion.
Query delay: Finally, we present the query delay when using
the Enron dataset. As the Enron dataset has more keyword-
document pairs than our synthesis dataset, deleting 25%
documents still triggers paging, as it includes more keyword-
document pairs than the whole synthesis dataset. In Fig. 6,
we present the query delay when querying the top-25 frequent
keywords in the Enron dataset. The result shows that SGX-
SE2 maintains a relative low query delay (530 ms to 900
ms) while SGX-SE1 needs 580 ms to 2.6 s and Bunker-B
requires 645 ms to 1.5 s. This above result further illustrates
that SGX-SE2 can both prevent the paging within the SGX
enclave and eliminate the cost of re-encryption.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we leverage the advance of Intel SGX to
design and implement forward and backward private dynamic
searchable encryption schemes. We carefully analyse the lim-
itations of the recent theoretical constructions and propose
new designs to avoid the bottleneck of the SGX enclave. We
present a basic scheme and then further optimise it for better
performance. We implement prior work and our schemes, and
conduct a detailed performance comparison. The results show
that our designs are more efficient in query latency and data
deletion.
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